Research on the link between intelligence and economic decision making is a recent development in the more general attempt to introduce theories of individual differences and personality traits into the analysis of economic behavior. We lay down here what we know from behavioral studies, from imaging studies, both functional and anatomical, and insights from decision theory and game theory. All the results point to a correlation and perhaps a deeper link between cognition and decision making, both in single-player and in strategic environments. We see several pieces of a puzzle, and provide some suggestions on how future research will discover the hidden image.
Introduction
An operational way of defining intelligence [1] begins with the empirical observation that test scores on cognitive tasks are positively correlated. If one then looks for an explanation of this regularity through exploratory factor analysis, one finds that scores in specific tests can be explained in a satisfactory way by a general factor (which Spearman called g) and an independent, task-specific factor. These conclusions have long been controversial, but they seem to be now widely accepted [2] . We will focus here on g (and call it intelligence) as the measurable individual characteristic of performance in general cognitive processes.
Economic decision making is the selection of one from a feasible set of options, each one having a value to the decision maker, and involves the processing of information on several relevant variables describing the options. This process is already complex in the case of an individual acting in isolation, as it requires an understanding of the options offered, whether at the supermarket or in the laboratory, an introspective evaluation of the prospective pleasure derived from each, perhaps on the basis of previous experiences, and the risk or time delay involved in the case of monetary payments. Information processing is even more complex in decision making in a strategic environment, where the consequences depends both on the choice made by the individual and the choices made by others. We will examine here the relation between intelligence and economic decision making; we ignore the obviously important, related but different issue of intelligence and economic outcomes (which is discussed instead for instance in [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] ).
Intelligence and the method of choice
It seems natural to consider decision making as a special cognitive task, provide a definition of performance in this case, and expect (because of the g factor) this performance to be correlated with that exhibited in other tasks. The definition of performance in economic choices should not bind the individual to a particular preference over options, but should only constrain the method of choice. For example, if a, b, and c are lotteries with monetary payments, the choice between a and b and that between b and c should be entirely a matter of taste, and have no bearing on the general cognitive ability of the person who is doing the choosing. However, a reasonable consistency requirement (called transitivity) in choice is that if you prefer option a to b, and b to c, then you should not prefer c to a. That this is the case has been experimentally verified in recent years [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] : individuals with higher scores in IQ tests (e.g. Raven matrices) are more likely to be consistent. Similarly, individuals with higher intelligence should be less sensitive to irrelevant details in the presentation of the options (framing).
A similar correlation might also seem reasonable in strategic environments, although in this case the restrictions on behavior are substantially weaker. This is a consequence of the fact that, since the outcome of an action depends on the actions of others, and prediction of what the other will do depends on what they think you will do, different actions might be equally reasonable depending on appropriate beliefs about what the others will do. A solution concept (that is, a theory that selects some joint behavior of players among all the possible ones) exists [13, 14] that only requires an action to be justifiable for some belief on what the others are going to do. This is the case if the action is the best choice given some belief about the choice of others, provided those beliefs are in turn a best choice given some belief about the choice of others, and so on. Even if one adopts this criterion (called rationalizability, which is weaker than the usual Nash www.sciencedirect.com
